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Edward Heath, the Declaration of Perth and the Scottish Conservative and 
Unionist Party, 1966-19701 
 
 
And so in this situation I turn again to our basic principles. We find 
there two important strands. The first is that we have long been the 
Party of Union. Our fundamental belief is in the destiny of the United 
Kingdom …. The second strand is our belief in the devolution of 
power.2 
 
At the Scottish Conservative and Unionist Party conference in Perth Assembly 
Rooms in May 1968, Edward Heath thus attempted to provide some 
intellectual framework for what was intended as a bold policy announcement: 
the Conservative proposition for an elected Scottish Assembly. The press met 
what almost immediately became known as the ‘Declaration of Perth’ with a 
mixture of constructive comment and mocking cynicism. Some commentators 
engaged with the policy and its intellectual justifications and congratulated 
Heath on a bold, if unrefined, attempt to meet a clear groundswell of support 
for changes to how Scotland was governed. Criticism was summed up by 
David Wood in the Times, who pilloried what he saw as a ‘vote-grabbing 
stunt’, a source of bitter intra-party contention and, in its presentation, ‘a 
rather pathetic publicists’ attempt to catch historic echoes from the 
Declaration of Arbroath’.3 In reality, what Heath had proposed at Perth was 
simply the establishment of a committee to discuss and report on the idea of a 
Scottish Assembly. Immediate confusion within both the parliamentary party 
and activists in Scotland revolved around exactly what had been proposed: 
was the speech intended as a ‘proposal or a commitment’; was the committee 
to work out how best to establish a Scottish Assembly or to consider ‘the 
desirability and advisability of the setting up in Scotland of such a body’?4 
Perhaps more worryingly, similar questions were still being put by the 
proposed membership of the Constitutional Committee itself in August 1968.5 
It was an inauspicious beginning.  
The best and most detailed analysis of the genesis, presentation and 
fate of these Conservative proposals for devolution has been provided by 
James Mitchell. His account focuses on the tactical drivers behind Heath’s 
                                            
1 I would like to thank Ewen Cameron, Matthew Cragoe, Robert Crowcroft, Alvin Jackson and 
Malcolm Petrie for reading and commenting on earlier drafts. Some of the research for this 
article was undertaken as a visiting fellow at the Humanities Research Centre, RSHA, 
Australian National University and I gratefully acknowledge this support. 
2 Bodleian Library [hereafter Bod. Lib.], Conservative Party Archive [hereafter CPA], 
CRD3/28/7, ‘The Rt Hon. Edward Heath Speaking at the Scottish Conservative and Unionist 
Conference in Perth’, 18 May 1968. 
3 The Times, 8 July 1968. 
4 National Library of Scotland [hereafter NLS], Scottish Conservative & Unionist Association 
Papers [hereafter SCUA], Acc.11368/79, Notes on discussion of Scottish Assembly proposals 
7 June [1968] at the Central Council of the SCUA; Acc.11368/17, Minute of adjourned 
meeting of Glasgow Regional Council, 11 July 1968. 
5 NLS, SCUA, Acc.11368/170, Prof. J. D. B. Mitchell to Alec Douglas-Home, n.d. [August 
1968].  
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announcement, which is presented as an ill-starred attempt to play the 
‘Scottish card’ in the context of an increasing electoral threat from the Scottish 
National Party (SNP). Heath’s major failure was to carry his party with him to 
endorse a policy that masqueraded as a major shift in Conservative policy, 
but in reality represented little more than an extension of the Westminster 
committee system.6 Indeed, later critics could (retrospectively) paint the 
episode as an ill augury of what was to come, the first of a series of u-turns.7 
Certainly few would now argue that the Declaration of Perth was anything but 
an abject failure. The Constitutional Committee to which it gave birth and 
which endorsed a Scottish ‘Convention’ sitting in Edinburgh and acting as a 
cross between a beefed-up Scottish Grand Committee and a third chamber of 
Parliament (scrutinizing, discussing and amending Scottish legislation) was 
adopted as official party policy for the 1970 election.  
That nothing came of this pledge can partly be explained by a timeless 
dynamic identified in a contemporary pamphlet: ‘Politicians concerned with 
Scotland are almost nationalistic when they are out of office: when they form a 
government they become obstinately and even blindly unionist’.8 Even if we 
accept that power made devolution far less appealing to Conservative 
politicians, arguably the Committee was swiftly overtaken by events well in 
advance of its report. The overlapping concerns of Harold Wilson’s Royal 
Commission on the Constitution, established in 1969, and of the 
Conservatives’ own actions on local government reform diluted the 
Committee’s raison d’être. By 1970 the Scottish National Party success at the 
Hamilton by-election in 1967 seemed more like nationalism’s apotheosis 
rather than the beginning of an existential threat to two-party politics.9 Events 
in the only part of the United Kingdom operating ‘devolved’ government – 
Northern Ireland – and the eventual prorogation of the Stormont Parliament 
raised fresh questions about the wisdom of the policy.10 The chaotic series of 
challenges that met Heath’s government after 1970 administered the final 
blows and the official Conservative commitment to a Scottish Assembly died, 
unlamented by most, in 1973.  
Nevertheless, increasingly nuanced histories of unionism in twentieth-
century Britain should encourage historians to revisit the Declaration of Perth 
as a revealing episode in the history of Conservatism in Scotland. While 
recent work has in part rescued the Labour Party from the charge of political 
opportunism by placing Labour policies on devolution within wider intellectual 
and political horizons, such an exercise ought, if anything, to be easier for the 
                                            
6 James Mitchell, Conservatives and the Union: A Study of Conservative Party Attitudes to 
Scotland (Edinburgh, 1990), pp. 52-68. 
7 Ian Lang, Blue Remembered Years: A Political Memoir (London, 2002), p. 169. 
8 H. J. Paton, The Claim of Scotland (London, 1968), p. 10. 
9 Useful contemporary perspectives are found in James Kellas’s treatment of Scottish 
nationalism in David Butler and Michael Pinto-Duschinsky, The British General Election of 
1970 (London, 1971), pp. 446-62; Iain McLean, ‘The Rise and Fall of the SNP’, Political 
Studies, 18 (1970), 357-72.  
10 For the neglected history of Northern Ireland’s role in discussion of Scottish government 
see Graham Walker, ‘Scotland, Northern Ireland, and Devolution, 1945-1979’, Journal of 
British Studies, 49 (2010), 117-42. 
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Conservative Party.11 Indeed, this has partly been achieved and, in line with a 
more general rehabilitation of the historical study of Conservative ideas, 
historians have increasingly argued that the devolutionary pedigree of the 
Conservative and Unionist Party did provide some sound intellectual 
justification for the policy.12 Within this revised historiography the Declaration 
of Perth can appear less as a starkly opportunistic ‘reversal of policy’ and 
more as ‘a missed opportunity to take a long-held commitment to 
administrative devolution all the way to a legislative end’.13  
By examining in detail the evolution and reception of the Declaration of 
Perth between 1966 and 1970 this article in part aims to provide a more 
nuanced account of the policy, one that pays some attention to its roots within 
long-range histories of Conservatism/Unionism, but gives due weight to the 
interaction of these ideas with more immediate tactical, strategic and 
organizational issues.14 It attempts a more fully contextualized account of 
Conservative thinking and action on devolution and on Scotland at a specific 
historical moment. It thus differs from existing accounts from historians and 
political scientists, which almost exclusively examine the relationship between 
the Conservative Party and Scotland within a long-term perspective and 
through the lens of ‘decline’.15 Chronology is important in any such detailed 
analysis and the first part of this article establishes a timeline leading up to 
Heath’s speech at Perth. It is argued that, while the Conservatives did 
consider the apparent threat posed by nationalism both more seriously and 
more promptly than the Labour Party, as in the past it was electoral 
considerations that drove them to act. The account is, however, broadened 
out to incorporate a number of other contexts that help to explain the 
Declaration. First, it was part of a more compound sense of crisis in the late 
1960s, ‘a moment when the moral coherence of the postwar era appeared to 
be in jeopardy’.16 As such, it was intimately linked to other areas of concern 
including not only Welsh nationalism, but also English nationalism and a 
                                            
11 Duncan Tanner, ‘Harold Wilson and Devolution, 1966-70: The Making of Government 
Policy’, Twentieth Century British History, 17 (2006), 545-78; Graham Walker, ‘John P. 
Mackintosh, Devolution and the Union’, Parliamentary Affairs, 66 (2013), 557-78. 
12 See especially Matthew Cragoe, ‘“We like local patriotism”: The Conservative Party and the 
Discourse of Decentralisation, 1947-51’, English Historical Review, 122 (2007), 965-85; idem, 
‘Defending the Nation: The Conservative Party and the Idea of Devolution, 1945-1974’, in 
Andrew Edwards and C. Williams (eds), The Art of the Possible: Politics and Governance in 
Modern British History: Essays in Memory of Duncan Tanner (forthcoming, Manchester, 
2014); Alvin Jackson, The Two Unions: Ireland, Scotland, and the Survival of the United 
Kingdom, 1707-2007 (2012), ch. 7; Catriona Macdonald, ‘More than a Name: The Union and 
the Un-doing of Scottish Conservatism in the Twentieth Century’, in David Torrance (ed.), 
Whatever Happened to Tory Scotland? (Edinburgh, 2012), pp. 43-61; Paul Ward, Unionism in 
the United Kingdom, 1918-1974 (Basingstoke, 2005). 
13 Mitchell, Conservatives and the Union, p. 56; Macdonald, ‘More than a Name’, p. 45. 
14 Matthew Cragoe has come closest to providing this kind of account in ‘Defending the 
Nation’. 
15 David Seawright and John Curtice, ‘The Decline of the Scottish Conservative and Unionist 
Party 1950-92’: Religion, Ideology or Economics?’, Contemporary British History, 9 (1995), 
319-42; Michael Dyer, ‘The Evolution of the Centre-right and the State of Scottish 
Conservatism’, Political Studies, 49 (2001), 30-50. 
16 Camilla Schofield, Enoch Powell and the Making of Postcolonial Britain (Cambridge, 2013), 
p. 19. 
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perceived disengagement and cynicism about all political activity. Second, the 
Declaration was characteristic of a unique period of Conservative policy-
making and had an important context in organizational reforms and leadership 
attempts to rehabilitate Conservative fortunes in Scotland.  
This last area is especially important. While the existing historiography 
is eloquent on how the Conservatives could arrive at such a policy, it is less 
convincing on why it proved such a tremendous flop within the Scottish 
Conservative and Unionist Party. Certainly, there was a lack of consultation 
before the Declaration, but this was hardly unique during a period of restless 
policy-making. While some have discussed Conservative thinking on 
devolution alongside what Alvin Jackson describes as the ‘clear evidence of 
organizational sclerosis’ in the Scottish party, the crucial relationship between 
the two has been neglected.17 The second part of the article thus examines 
the responses to the Declaration and the Constitutional Committee by party 
members and activists in Scotland. It is in these responses and the bringing 
together of ideological and organizational perspectives that one of the ‘ironies’ 
of Conservative failure in Scotland is revealed. A policy explicitly aimed at 
decentralization of power to Scotland was driven by Conservatives in London 
and by the Scottish Central Office (SCO) in Edinburgh. At the same time 
increasing centralization of the party from the mid-1960s was alienating 
activists and supporters. Hence most criticism of the devolution policy within 
the Scottish party took the form of rejecting its development and presentation 
rather than its aims and language. 
 
I 
 
Establishing an accurate chronology and context for the Declaration of Perth 
is important, most especially as the timing and the manner in which the policy 
was developed became issues on which discussions within the party focused. 
Heath himself later gave one much-cited explanation, which established the 
context of ‘“anti-system” voting’ and the ‘tide of nationalistic sentiment’ and 
cast devolution as a ‘pressure valve for moderate nationalist aspirations’:  
 
Our party policy in March 1966 had been robustly opposed to the 
establishment of a Scottish assembly, a policy that I had inherited from a 
whole string of my predecessors … But, in the light of the evident shift in 
opinion since that election, it would have been politically suicidal to stick 
to our guns. So, in June 1967, I set up a Scottish Policy Group with a 
completely open brief … The suggestion for a Scottish Assembly would 
therefore come from the Scottish Conservative Party.18 
 
Two key features of this narrative are worth underlining: first, the claim that 
Conservative policy represented a well-considered and intellectually 
consistent response to a wider crisis of politics in the late 1960s, which 
included Scottish and Welsh nationalism, but also the challenge represented 
                                            
17 Jackson, Two Unions, pp. 262-4. 
18 Edward Heath, The Course of My Life: My Autobiography (London, 1998), pp. 294-5. 
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by Enoch Powell’s pronouncements on immigration and by a more pervasive 
sense of cynicism about formal politics; second, the insistence that the policy 
enshrined in the Declaration and the subsequent Constitutional Committee 
was emphatically not a knee-jerk response to the result of the Hamilton by-
election. Heath thus retrospectively answered criticism which had emerged 
from the press and from within the party at the time that the Conservatives 
had been ‘panicked’ into support for a measure of devolution.19  
 Needless to say, this narrative was only partially accurate. Indeed, 
Heath did acknowledge that disastrous electoral performances in Scotland in 
1964 (when the Party lost seven seats) and 1966 (when it lost a further four) 
had both stimulated significant rethinking on the party’s position in Scotland. 
One result in 1965 had been a sweeping reorganization aimed at 
professionalizing what was seen (from the perspective of London) as a 
creaking and antiquated party machinery, ‘all terribly feudal’ in the words of 
one London Central Office figure.20 These moves to centralization were 
capped by a presentational centralization, which saw the historic name of 
Scottish Unionist Party ditched in favour of the Scottish Conservative and 
Unionist Party.21 Such efforts were revisited after 1966, as part of a more 
general reorganization of party machinery and strategy, which included 
‘Project ‘67’ and efforts to exert greater central control of candidate selection 
and to coordinate interventions in ‘critical seats’.22 This sense of restless 
change within the Scottish party had important implications for the reception 
of Heath’s announcement. 
 The 1966 election also provided ample reasons for the Conservatives 
to take seriously the increased visibility and ambitions of the Scottish National 
Party. The SNP had doubled its vote and fielded twenty-three candidates and 
an additional stimulus was provided by the victory of Gwynfor Evans at the 
Carmarthen by-election in July 1966.23  Such electoral warnings were to 
continue and even victories could give pause for thought. At the Glasgow 
Pollok by-election in March 1967, the strong SNP intervention ended up 
assisting the return of Esmond Wright for the Conservatives by reducing the 
Labour share of the vote by over twenty per cent. It also, however, reduced 
the Conservative share of the vote by over ten per cent and was at least 
partially responsible for Wright’s highlighting of the Conservative record of 
administrative devolution and his later support for further measures.24  
The tactical picture both at this stage and subsequently was not one 
solely concerned with the nationalist threat, but also with how other parties 
                                            
19 Powell’s famous ‘rivers of blood’ speech had been delivered on 20 Apr. 1968 and was 
discussed alongside Scottish nationalism in Heath, Course of My Life, pp. 290-4.  
20 Butler and Pinto-Duschinsky, General Election of 1970, p. 100. 
21 David Seawright, An Important Matter of Principle: The Decline of the Scottish Conservative 
and Unionist Party (Aldershot, 1999), chs 1, 7.  
22 Tim Bale, The Conservatives since 1945: Drivers of Party Change (Oxford, 2012), ch. 4; 
David Butler and Michael Pinto-Duschinsky, The British General Election of 1970 (London, 
1971), pp. 94-110. 
23 Peter Lynch, SNP: The History of the Scottish National Party (Cardiff, 2002), ch. 5. 
24 NLS, SCUA, Acc.11368/91, Campaign material for Pollok by-election; James Mitchell, 
‘Scottish Nationalism and Devolution’, in Peter Dorey (ed.), The Labour Governments 1964-
1970 (London, 2006), pp. 196-7. 
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responded to the changing environment. Among the Conservatives’ four 
losses in 1966 were two to Labour candidates who would become standard-
bearers for that party’s approach to devolution (Donald Dewar in Aberdeen 
South and J. P. Mackintosh in East Lothian and Berwick). After Orpington, the 
Liberals also loomed larger in Conservative minds. Since their wipeout at the 
1945 general election the Liberals had moved to five seats in Scotland by 
1966, a net gain won at the expense of the Conservatives. A Liberal 
candidate who both exemplified his party’s newly youthful appeal and made 
much of its commitment to federalism and the devolution of power, David 
Steel, extended his majority in Roxburgh, Selkirk and Peebles, having won it 
from the Conservatives at a by-election in March 1965.25 With Liberals ever 
more ready to trumpet their commitment to devolution and to explore ‘re-
alignment’, through agreements with both Labour and the SNP, they formed 
part of Conservative electoral calculus.26 Indeed, it is likely that strong Liberal 
presence and traditions in the north-east of Scotland helped move 
Conservatives to devolutionary positions.27 James Kellas rightly pointed to the 
‘all-pervading Scottish national consciousness in every sector of public and 
private life’ as one appealed to by all parties. Where to position itself within 
this shifting marketplace was a key aspect of Conservative thinking. 
Such concerns about electoral decline and about the relative positions 
of other parties were central to the Conservative Research Department’s 
(CRD) report into ‘Nationalism and Regionalism’ in 1966. The electoral 
rationale and ‘the recurring fear of a rash of Celtic Orpingtons’ was made 
clear in a paper littered with question marks about the nationalist 
phenomenon. It raised the key issues with which the Conservatives would 
grapple over the subsequent decade. First, ‘Is there a Conservative Answer to 
the Political Appeal of the Nationalists?’ and ‘Is it a weakness that we do not 
make a specifically nationalist appeal in Wales and Scotland?’ Second, what 
was the relationship between these problems and current interest in 
‘regionalism’ in the form of territorially distinctive economic policies. The key 
problematic here was how far nationalism could be met by changes to local 
government and rolled into a UK-wide policy or whether something more 
targeted – ‘an opium for disenchanted Celts’ – was required.28 
 This report marked the beginning of a serious engagement by the 
central organs of the Conservative Party with nationalism and the attempt to 
understand its implications for the party’s electoral prospects and policies in 
the 1960s and beyond. Such engagement did not, of course, emerge ex nihilo 
and the Conservative Party had a variety of intellectual traditions on which it 
could draw. Both Irish and imperial issues from the 1880s onwards had 
prompted a flurry of thinking about the nature of the union-state and its 
                                            
25 Mitchell, ‘Scottish nationalism’, p. 206; David Torrance, David Steel: Rising Hope to Elder 
Statesman (London, 2012), pp. 24-9. 
26 Glasgow Herald, 10 June and 20 and 21 Sept. 1968; Vernon Bogdanor, Devolution in the 
United Kingdom (Oxford, 1999), pp. 128-30. 
27 See for example the resolution in NLS, SCUA, Acc.11368/38, North East Regional Council, 
11 Feb. 1967. 
28 Bod. Lib., CPA, SUMC(66)8, ‘Nationalism and Regionalism’, 26 July 1966. 
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governance, which included, for example, the Round Table Movement and 
federalist or 'home rule all round' solutions.29  
 In the Scottish context, Unionists had been successful for much of the 
twentieth century not only in their effective deployment of the language of 
Scottish nationality, but also in their leadership of the reform of Scottish 
government and administration. The Conservatives had acted as the midwife 
to the Scottish Office in 1885 and during the interwar period it was Unionists 
who led the way in deepening and broadening administrative devolution.30 
After 1945, the party had responded quickly and creatively to the apparent 
nationalist threat represented by the Covenant movement, by proposing and 
then implementing further reforms, which dovetailed neatly with wider 
arguments about localism and decentralization.31 All of these measures were 
developed within a framework in which the maintenance of the Union and of 
the pre-eminence of the Westminster Parliament were central, but they 
furnished a plausible set of precedents from which Conservatives might take 
the lead in reforming Scottish institutions. Indeed, they were traditions that 
were specifically referenced in the historical section of Heath’s speech at 
Perth.32 That Heath and others felt it necessary to remind the Party of these 
precedents, however, may help to explain some of the mixed responses to the 
Declaration. Similarly, the existence of these traditions is not, in itself, an 
adequate explanation for Conservative actions in the late 1960s. As Cragoe 
has lucidly demonstrated much more attention needs to be paid to the 
interaction between ideas about devolution and decentralization and policy 
positions which were ‘always, at root, a calculation made with an eye to 
electoral success’.33  
 Additionally, such efforts need to be seen within the context of the 
distinctive Conservative approach to opposition and policy-making during the 
period 1964 to 1970. The proliferation of policy groups after 1964, whose 
reports were to populate the 1966 manifesto, was one shift, in part designed 
to provide new policies for an increasingly volatile electorate. After the general 
election many policy groups were reconvened and others were established. 
They have come to be seen as ‘the hallmark of the Heath leadership as a 
whole’, a fitting token of his aspirations to managerialize and professionalize 
                                            
29 Philip Lynch, Sovereignty, Britishness and Conservative Politics (Basingstike, 1999), pp. 
15-19; J. E. Kendle, 'The Round Table Movement and "Home Rule All Round"', Historical 
Journal, 11 (1968), 332-53. 
30 James Mitchell, Governing Scotland: The Invention of Administrative Devolution 
(Basingstoke, 2003), chs 2, 6-7. 
31 See, for example, NLS, SCUA, Acc. 11368/80, Papers on Scottish Nationalism, which 
include correspondence relating to and drafts of the official Unionist pamphlet, Scotland and 
the United Kingdom: The Unionist Party's Practical Policy for Scottish Administration of 
Scottish Affairs and Scotland's Part in Great Britain (Edinburgh, 1948); Cragoe, '"We like local 
patriotism"'; Ian Levitt, 'Britain, the Scottish Covenant Movement and Devolution, 1946-50', 
Scottish Affairs, 22 (1998), 33-57. 
32 Bod. Lib., CPA, CRD3/28/7, ‘The Rt Hon. Edward Heath Speaking at the Scottish 
Conservative and Unionist Conference in Perth’, 18 May 1968. 
33 Cragoe, ‘Defending the Nation’. 
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policy-making and, latterly government.34 Outside of a few key areas, 
however, such as taxation and trade union law, the approach was far more 
chaotic and hand-to-mouth, with many policies made ‘on the hoof by the 
leader’.35 A further aspect of this overhaul of the party was a much more 
substantial engagement with polling and the ruthless identification of target 
seats and a ‘critical seats engagement scheme’ to win these over. This latter 
included the targeting of advertising revenue and the mandating of cabinet 
visits.36 These contexts help to explain the distinctive Conservative approach 
to devolution every bit as much as pre-existing ideological currents. 
The general questions of the first report in 1966 were followed by the 
commissioning of professional research to provide a more solid basis on 
which to proceed. A statistically-based interview study from the Opinion 
Research Centre (ORC) was produced for Conservative Central Office (CCO) 
in November 1966.37 It was, nevertheless, more direct electoral pressures that 
turned the aspirations to research and inform into a concern to make policy.  
 
II 
 
It was the immediate aftermath of the Hamilton by-election in November 1967 
that saw both an assessment of the electoral implications of a strong SNP 
showing and moves towards generating and formalizing a Conservative policy 
on devolution. As electoral prospects were weighed up, Scottish nationalism 
was now decisively decoupled from its Welsh counterpart in this research for 
the simple reason identified by Cragoe: the Conservatives had less to lose 
and less to win in Wales than in Scotland.38 Research flowed into CCO and 
estimates of the electoral dimension projected that if the SNP fought all the 
Scottish seats and took votes away from Labour and Conservative candidates 
in the same proportion as they had at Hamilton and that there was a uniform 
swing from Labour to the Conservatives, both of the established parties would 
be decimated in Scotland. 39 It was an unlikely prediction, but demonstrates 
how the febrile context of the winter of 1967-8 was concentrating minds. The 
Labour Party was, albeit more slowly, considering similar doomsday 
scenarios.40 
                                            
34 Mark Garnett, ‘Planning for Power: 1964-1970’, in Stuart Ball and Anthony Seldon (eds), 
Recovering Power: The Conservatives in Opposition since 1867 (Basingstoke, 2005), p. 205; 
Bale, Conservatives since 1945, pp. 120-9. 
35 John Campbell, Edward Heath: A Biography (London, 1993), p. 218. 
36 Bale, Conservatives since 1945, pp. 114-20; Garnett, ‘Planning’ p. 200; Campbell, Edward 
Heath, p. 215; Butler and Pinto-Duschinsky, General Election of 1970, pp. 288-91, 312-13. 
37 Bod. Lib., CPA, CCO500/50/1, ‘Special Attitudes in Scotland, Wales and the West Country’, 
Nov. 1966. 
38 Cragoe, ‘Defending the Nation’. 
39 Bod. Lib., CPA, CCO 500/50/1, ‘Hamilton By-Election’, 6 Nov. 1967; Memorandum from 
Tommy Thompson to Anthony Barber ‘The Implications of the Nationalist win at Hamilton’, 
n.d. [Nov. 1967]; CRD3/28/6, ‘Estimate of the Electoral Effects of the Rise of the Scottish 
National Party in Scotland since the 1966 General Election’, 26 Feb. 1968. The report gave 
the figures as SNP 47, Conservatives 12, Labour 8, Liberals 4. 
40 See, for example, Crossman’s predictions that the SNP challenge ‘may well lost us half the 
Scottish seats in the next election’, Richard Crossman, Diaries of a Cabinet Minister Volume 
Three: Secretary of State for Social Services (London, 1977), p. 82. 
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After Hamilton the move towards action was immediate and came from 
the top. A secret meeting was held at Heath’s Albany flat on 16 November 
1967. It agreed on one overriding strategic imperative that would shape 
Conservative policy to 1970: ‘to show that we accepted that Scotland had 
protested against the present situation – had risen in dissent, but that we were 
the Party who was going to take note of this protest and meet the justifiable 
grievances of the Scots’. There followed thirteen action points, ranging from a 
concerted press campaign against the SNP to plans for Michael Noble to wine 
and dine Scottish editors and for Heath to give occasional drinks to the 
Scottish members, one of those convivial efforts to ‘bridge the social gap 
between the leader and his party’.41 
One substantial move was the commissioning of new market research 
and polling, especially in target seats.42 This came from the ORC in March 
1968 and proceeded via the method of small ‘discussion groups’. In line with 
the electoral strategy, this was focused on Scotland’s ‘critical seats’, with 
groups convened in West Aberdeenshire, West Renfrew, Glasgow Woodside 
and Kelvingrove and Berwick and East Lothian and East Dunbarton. Of these, 
only the last was not on CCO’s list of nine critical seats (and was contested in 
1970 by Barry Henderson of SCO, which might have been one reason for its 
inclusion).43 The eventual report was a damning indictment of the 
Conservative Party in Scotland – ‘the only Scottish Party which, on mention, 
often elicited mirthful or mirthless laughter’ – which suggested that nothing but 
a complete and radical restructuring could rescue its fortunes. This report 
clearly did have some impact on strategy – echoes of its recommendation to 
stress ‘world trends towards economic interdependence’ were present in 
Heath’s speech at Perth, for example – and most importantly it confirmed the 
direction in which policy was precipitately moving:  
 
What does emerge from the research is that the desire for a greater 
say by Scotland in her own affairs, greater autonomy of some sort, 
runs right through the nation. Even anti-nationalists who are still loyal to 
the Conservative Party share this feeling in a subdued form.44 
 
More substantially, George Younger was to oversee the policy group on 
Scottish government and to ensure ‘that it should press ahead as quickly as 
possible with its work, and should report within six months time’.45 This was 
asking a great deal. The group’s first meeting would not occur until 14 
December 1967. Although the SCUA had passed a resolution in favour of 
such a group in June 1967 and for some months there had been discussions 
                                            
41 Campbell, Edward Heath, p. 216. 
42 Bod. Lib., CPA, CRD3/28/6, ‘Scottish Nationalism: Points of Action Agreed at the Meeting 
held at Albany on 16 November 1967’.  
43 Bod. Lib., CPA, CRD3/28/6, Humphrey Taylor to Sir Michael Fraser, 29 Feb. 1968.  
44 Bod. Lib., CPA, CCO500/50/1, ‘The Motivations behind Scottish Nationalism’, Mar. 1968, 
pp. 4, 28, 32. 
45 Bod. Lib., CPA, CRD3/28/6, ‘Scottish Nationalism: Points of Action’; CRD 3/28/7, 
Government of Scotland Policy Group Members, 11 Jan. 1968.  
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drifting towards some action on regional policy and devolution no official group 
was either constituted or met until after Hamilton.46  
The policy group thus worked very quickly. Heath made it clear 
following a disappointing visit to Scotland in late January that on each of three 
subsequent visits to Scotland across the year he wished to make ‘major policy 
pronouncements’, with the principal one on devolution at the Scottish party’s 
conference: ‘It was therefore imperative that the Group should work at top 
speed.’47 The group was thus encouraged to produce (and did produce) an 
interim report by April, which would allow any announcement to clear cabinet 
discussion ahead of Perth. Its own terms of reference and methods of working 
indicate how fluid and unformed the concept of ‘devolution’ as policy was at 
this stage. The group rapidly considered and rejected what it took to be three 
existing frameworks – separatist, federal and ‘Stormont’ – within which the 
government of Scotland might be remodeled. It then sketched out (quite 
literally) the plan for an elected Assembly that would furnish Heath’s Perth 
speech.48 
When it came to consideration of the proposals, three sorts of analysis 
– intellectual, tactical, presentational – were combined. Peter Goldman’s 
separate report was rare in pointing out a devolutionary policy as having the 
potential to be seen as ‘an opportunistic volte-face’ given that ‘the broad 
history and tradition of the Party are anti-“home rule”’. His report clearly 
envisaged something more substantial – full legislative devolution – and 
welcomed this as a potential political masterstroke: ‘For Conservatives to 
become advocates and later architects of home rule, thus spiking the guns of 
Socialists, Liberals and Nationalists alike, is the most dramatic step we could 
take to retrieve this strength.’49 Others tended to stress that the group’s 
recommendations be presented as ‘part of the broad evolution of our existing 
policy’ allied to administrative devolution and to local government reform.50 
Other considerations were more ruthlessly tactical and in presenting his 
assessment of the proposals to cabinet, the Scottish Secretary’s first 
conclusion was based on very short-term considerations: ‘The Socialists got a 
universally bad press in Scotland by refusing at their Conference last month 
even to contemplate change.’51 
There was, therefore, awareness that, while tactical opportunities 
required the production of policy at high speed, this in itself presented 
considerable presentational problems. Indeed, cooler heads, among which 
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was that of Brendon Sewill of the CRD, warned that if the proposals did not at 
least bear the appearance of having been thoroughly thought through then 
there was considerable danger that they would look ‘like a gimmick’. He 
informed Heath that NOP polls for February and April showed the SNP on a 
level of support well below that at which the CRD would consider it moving 
‘from being a minor irritant to being a major threat’ and which it had been 
polling after Hamilton: ‘This perhaps suggests that we should not be panicked 
into any rush move which we might later regret.’52 It was a dilemma shared by 
the Labour party in the months after Hamilton and Harold Wilson similarly 
warned: ‘Obviously we must not panic, or be seen to be reacting to recent 
events’.53 While Wilson slowly oversaw the development of a strategy, 
restrained in part by the strong opposition to devolution among senior figures 
within the Scottish Labour movement, it was characteristic of Heath in 
opposition to tilt at a ‘gap in the market’ and attempt a bold policy 
announcement.54 
 
III 
 
Presentational issues came to the fore immediately following Heath’s speech. 
Some colleagues were happy enough to congratulate him for having ‘got in 
ahead of the Socialists’ and, indeed, the speech at Perth received a 
backhanded compliment from Richard Crossman, battling to shape his own 
party’s response to Scottish nationalism: ‘it is a Conservative concession to 
nationalism and it is cunning that he has managed to get it in before the 
Government.’55 Others further strengthened the intellectual case and in one 
paper, circulated to the shadow cabinet, the historian Robert Blake began with 
Lord Carnarvon’s far-seeing Conservative support for home rule in the 1880s 
to make the point: ‘The proposals adumbrated in Mr Heath’s speech … 
constitute a possible remedy which is quite consistent with the Conservative 
tradition and in no way destroys the principle of the Union.’56  
A substantial problem remained. While the genesis and execution of 
the ‘policy’ unveiled at Perth had been a frothy admixture of both short and 
longer term tactical considerations as well as both sustained and recent 
engagement with questions of the machinery of government, decentralization 
and regionalism, there had been little effort to consult the party in Scotland. 
Certainly few outside of the SCO in Edinburgh had any intelligence of the 
ongoing discussion. Over the summer the Constitutional Committee was put 
together while the policy group could continue its work at a more leisurely 
pace. Even the composition of the Committee was not without incident, the 
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initial appointment of Lord Avonside ensuring a nasty spat in the press over 
how appropriate it was to have judges serving on such bodies.57 The 
Committee was given clear terms of reference, with the leading aim to ‘keep 
the United Kingdom united’ and met for the first time on 13 September 1969. 
Over the following sixteen meetings, the Committee followed the grooves of 
the policy group by considering and rejecting independence, ‘federalism’ and 
a Stormont-style solution and published its report in March 1970.58 
One dissenting member of the policy group summed up the challenge 
that faced the party and, to a lesser extent, the Committee: ‘Major 
constitutional reforms cannot of course be based merely upon party 
advantages and must have national support. But one party will be in the 
difficult position of having to persuade its members to allow them to be carried 
out.’59 One key part of this effort at persuasion was to address the issue of 
presentation. As has been established, nothing that could reasonably be 
called a policy group began work before December 1967. Nevertheless, it 
formed an important part of the later presentation of devolution plans to the 
shadow cabinet, to the public at Perth and crucially to the party in Scotland 
that policy group discussions on Scotland’s government were instituted before 
Hamilton, in June 1967. Additionally, the mantra was repeated that the 
discussion had been initiated by the party in Scotland rather than CCO in 
London. Noble’s paper for the shadow cabinet in May 1968 put it succinctly: 
‘A fairly broad-based Committee was set up in June 1967 – long before 
Hamilton – to consider and report. They have worked hard and long and have 
now come up with an interim report.’60 They may have worked hard; they 
certainly had not worked long. It was the line taken by Heath in his speech at 
Perth and by subsequent attempts to defend the speech to the parliamentary 
party, activists in Scotland and the wider public.61 Such pleas were matched 
by letters to the press, which placed the mature consideration of Scotland’s 
government before the Hamilton result.62 George Younger and other members 
of the SCO busily toured regional councils pushing the same message, while 
Heath met with Scottish Conservatives in September in an attempt to better 
explain and defend the policy.63 That Younger and others were still pressing 
this chronology in letters to newspapers on the release of the Committee’s 
report in 1970 does rather suggest that these efforts were less than 
successful.64 
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While Ian Lang was certainly right that there had been little (indeed 
there had been little time for) consultation before Heath flew his kite at Perth, 
there was plentiful consultation after the event, though this occurred within 
some preordained limits.65 Indeed, one of the principal functions of the 
Committee was to consult widely and consider evidence from constitutional 
experts, business interests, key Scottish institutions and, importantly, the 
Scottish party itself. In particular, the members of the Committee received the 
answers to three papers sent out by SCO to canvas responses on the 
‘principles’, the ‘composition’ and the ‘powers’ of the proposed Scottish 
Assembly from constituency associations and branches.66  
Such papers provide a fascinating insight into the range of positions 
within the Party in Scotland. Certainly we should be sceptical about Heath’s 
later claims that ‘it was from the grass roots that the demands came that we 
should re-examine the whole of the government of Scotland’.67 We should 
also pause, however, before thinking of devolution policy as something 
unwelcome foisted upon an unyieldingly ‘unionist’ grassroots or on a 
membership unwilling to discuss such issues. The press tended to 
concentrate on the divisive impact of devolution. The Glasgow Herald, for 
example, quickly published survey evidence after Heath’s speech suggesting 
that sixty-two per cent of Glasgow’s Conservatives were in favour of either no 
change or greater local or regional freedom.68 What the latter phrase masked 
was that in the Conservative Party (as in all political parties in the 1960s and 
70s) there existed a range of opinions on the government of Scotland. The 
policy group’s own digest of the responses to the questionnaire was broadly 
accurate in reporting that:  
 
The majority of reports received accept the principle of a Scottish 
Assembly as proposed at Perth but there is a clear body of opinion 
opposed to it. This body is almost equally divided into two camps at 
opposite ends of the opinion spectrum. There is almost unanimous 
acceptance that some changes are needed in the institutions of 
government.69  
 
The policy group thus rightly presented Conservative opinion in Scotland as a 
spectrum. It is significant that very few responses sought to make a case that 
devolution was something that Conservatives could not consistently do or was 
ideologically objectionable. Few rejected Heath’s proposals on the basis of 
the kind of ‘Whig assimilationist’ unionism that would come to characterize 
later Conservative (especially Thatcherite) approaches to Scotland.70 The 
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outlines of this position were, however, evident in some responses from 
disgruntled MPs. Indeed, on the eve of the Perth speech Jock Bruce-Gardyne 
mapped out the territory in an article in the Spectator. The Scots were 
nationalist, but not in any sense fundamentally different from the English:  
 
We are turning to the SNP because the United Kingdom has ceased to 
satisfy us as a focus of national pride … two possible answers would 
appear relevant. One, of course, is the Scottish Nationalist answer. But 
the other is not some intermediate solution masquerading under the 
slogan of devolution. It is, quite simply, to reestablish belief and pride in 
Great Britain.71 
 
Such assimilationist voices were rare, though they were raised. Herbert 
Bonar, for example offered these sentiments: ‘As a business man I am a 
Briton and not a Scotsman and might add that in private life this is also true. I 
utterly deplore the present trend towards fragmentation in nationalities at a 
time when the only hope for the future of the world lies in the reverse 
direction.’72 Similarly, a note from an Englishman living in Glasgow was 
premised on an inflexible unionism, arguing that the whole discussion of 
nationalism had woken up English opinion to the large subsidies given to the 
Scots: ‘Further independence or devolution or whatever is unacceptable, 
unless it is total.’73 Others dismissed devolution out of hand as not relevant, 
echoing Bruce-Gardyne’s concerns that nationalism in Scotland was only a 
local symptom of a pan-British malaise. The Young Conservatives of West 
Edinburgh, for example, suggested: ‘the whole scheme should be scrapped 
… the Conservative Party should get back to old Conservative principles of 
security abroad and stability at home ... Nothing should be done which would 
upset the unity of Great Britain.’74 Hillhead Women’s Advisory Committee 
were even more curt: ‘get Good Govt. – get Country back on its feet – re-
establish pride in Britain and make Scotland feel part of Britain.’75  
A more common framework for the rejection of or scepticism towards 
Heath’s proposals was to argue that a Scottish Assembly was simply 
unnecessary, because the mechanisms and powers to recognize and to 
address Scottish discontents already existed. At one extreme, this could be 
argued by means of a kind of ‘analytic unionism’ that Kidd has identified as 
very close to nationalism in some of its concerns.76 The most fully realized 
criticism from this angle came from J. H. Macpherson of Newtonmore, whose 
trenchant statement was accompanied by supporting papers of various 
descriptions. He based his case on the argument that ‘The “Permanent” 
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Clauses in the Treaty of Union provide against each and every grievance that 
is voiced by the Nationalists’. In short, while accepting there were problems 
with both the Conservative Party’s performance north of the border and a 
climate of Scottish discontent, his remedy was very different from Heath’s:  
 
The Tory party has it in its power to sweep Scotland, if it can bring itself 
to show clearly in actions rather than in words, “We are the Unionists. 
We stand for the Union. Our policy is to ensure that the terms of the 
Union are enforced. Do this now, and all may yet be well. Leave it, and 
we can say goodbye to Great Britain and to all pride in the concept of 
“Britain” and “British”.’77  
  
More common was the acknowledgement that problems existed, of which 
nationalism was a symptom, but that the proposed solution was simply too 
dangerous and sweeping. Wilfred Baker (MP for Banffshire), for example, 
assured Michael Noble that, while he would not rock the boat, his reservations 
were serious: ‘There can be no half-way house between complete 
independence for Scotland – which we all abhor – and the present, though 
modified system of central government … I see the proposal as the beginning 
of the break-up of the United Kingdom.’78 Such criticisms often rested on the 
idea that similar aims might be achieved by far less hazardous means. Ian 
Lang, then a prospective candidate in Central Ayrshire, rejected the idea of 
constitutional experimentation to build ‘a half-way house; and one built at the 
top of a slippery slope.’ The solution to those problems, which Lang agreed to 
exist, was threefold: local government reform, further measures of 
administrative devolution, and the Scottish Grand Committee to meet in 
Edinburgh three times a year. The credentials of this latter body were to be 
enhanced by ‘an element of ceremony’ including a special service by the 
Moderator of the General Assembly of the Church of Scotland and an official 
opening by the Queen.79  
Also prominent in the responses were variations on Lang’s theme that, 
while an Assembly might be unnecessary, something needed to be seen to be 
done. This could take the form of either greater administrative devolution or 
better publicity for and use of that already attained: ‘some devolution of 
Government in Scotland is essential, but … this can be achieved through 
widening the existing scope and sphere of influence of St Andrews House.’80 
Such approaches could also be based on the idea that dissatisfaction came 
from the accumulation of small emotional grievances that required cosmetic 
alterations. This theme ran through a number of responses and formed part of 
Selby Wright’s contribution as a member of the Committee, where he argued 
for action on perennial sore points such as the use of ‘English’ for ‘British’ by 
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the BBC and the use of the English royal standard which were 
‘psychologically and emotionally important’.81 
At the other end of the spectrum were those disappointed responses 
from groups and individuals who believed that the Perth proposals did not go 
far enough. Most of these supported the work of the Committee, but voiced 
misgivings about the scope of reform. Prominent here was the Thistle Group, 
which had formed in November 1967. This ginger group of mainly younger 
Edinburgh-university educated Conservatives, quickly came to support a 
position of ‘federalism’ (or more accurately of ‘home rule all round’) 
encompassing local legislatures throughout the UK with wide-ranging financial 
powers. This they laid out to the Committee in both written and oral evidence, 
while welcoming Heath’s proposals as a ‘staging post’ on the road to a federal 
solution.82 
They were pushing uphill. The Committee had begun with considerable 
scepticism about the idea of federalism in Britain and the interventions of Sir 
Robert Menzies, former Prime Minister of Australia, were taken as decisive 
arguments against any kind of federal solution.83 Nevertheless, the language 
of a ‘home rule all round’ solution, which had long been a minority strand 
within unionist thought, enjoyed wider purchase than just the young Turks of 
the Thistle Group. A number of witnesses to the Committee – including a team 
from the Scotsman, which had gone into print in support of a federal solution, 
D. M. Walker, the Regius Professor of Law at Glasgow University, and various 
Liberal politicians – endorsed similar approaches.84 ‘Federal’ solutions were 
also proposed by a number of branches, for example in Kinross-shire and 
Aberdeenshire.85 It was also the implied framework of Constituency 
Associations and individuals who worried that uneven devolution to Scotland 
was either manifestly unjust or would create further and more acute political 
problems and who sought ‘a British not merely a Scottish solution’.86 Both 
Lord Drumalbyn and Viscount Muirshiel provided closely argued memoranda 
to the Committee stating that legislating only for a Scottish Assembly would be 
both unsafe and unjust ‘except within the context of similar regional devolution 
in England and Wales.’87 Some form of ‘devolution all round’ was also the 
preferred option of the Earl of Dundee, who wrote to Heath immediately after 
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his speech urging the case that an Assembly be accompanied by proportional 
representation.88 
Within the space marked at each end by a unitary British patriotism and 
an ideological commitment to home rule all round and other constitutional 
innovations lay most of the Conservative responses to the proposals. As Kidd 
has argued this ‘hybridity of the middle ground in Scottish political culture’ has 
been the victim of a historiography polarized around positions of unionism and 
nationalism.89 This hybridity was evident, of course, within parties as much as 
between them. Much the most common position was a hesitant welcome for 
rethinking the government of Scotland (often with caveat that this needed to 
encompass the whole of the UK) with concern over the tactical implications of 
Heath’s proposals. A large majority of respondents were prepared to answer 
‘yes’ to the very first question on the papers that had been circulated: ‘Are 
changes needed in the institutions of government, particularly in Scotland?’ 
The caveats increased in scale and complexity after this initial question. Some 
came to the conclusion that existing powers were sufficient or simply required 
some minor augmentation or presentational tweaking; others enthusiastically 
endorsed Heath’s plans or expressed the desire to take them further. 
 
IV 
 
There was thus no consensus within the Scottish Conservative and Unionist 
Party over how Scotland should best be governed or over the ideological 
implications of Heath’s proposals at Perth. Where there was a more obvious 
sense of consensus was over the genesis, timing and presentation of these 
proposals. In part, these responses were linked to the more general malaise 
with formal politics, a widespread ‘disaffection with traditional political 
polarities’, which had been identified in both the Party’s own Scottish research 
and across a range of political commentary in the later 1960s.90 One term that 
featured time and again in Conservative responses was ‘gimmick’, a word that 
had increasingly made its journey from advertising into the political lexicon 
during the 1960s (it would appear in this guise in its first entry to the OED in 
1972). Its prevalence exemplified a more general feeling of cynicism towards 
elected politicians, something seen, for example, in the plummeting public 
reputation of Harold Wilson both before and following devaluation of the 
pound. Indeed, accusations of ‘gimmickry’ and ‘trickery’ were something 
which Heath himself had made great use of in his attacks on the Prime 
Minister.91  
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This sentiment was strong among the grassroots response. A couple of 
examples will suffice. North Aberdeen Conservative Association Executive 
Committee reported: ‘A few of the members felt that the Scottish Assembly 
was in their opinion a “sop” to the Scottish Nationalists, and that we as a Party 
were merely trying to jump on the bandwagon; they went further when they 
described the proposal as a “gimmick” to be used at the next election’.92 In a 
similar vein Denny and Dunipace Conservative and Unionist Association 
asserted that: ‘Rather than presenting a definite attempt to reconstruct the 
present system of representation in Scotland within the framework of the UK, 
the Declaration of Perth strikes us as being hastily drawn up, indefinite and 
entirely too “gimmicky” … We find it merely a lame attempt to combat Scottish 
Nationalism’.93  
This was in part a local variant of a wider discontent with the style and 
shape of Heath’s leadership and his approach to policy-making. Criticism was 
also, in part, a local manifestation of the perennial prickliness of constituency 
associations when faced with dictation from the centre. In the Scottish 
context, however, this was intimately linked to a wider crisis of organization 
and management. The Declaration of Perth was discussed within a 
fundamentally demoralized party and was, indeed, partially an attempt to 
improve upon party morale. It came after a number of years of restless 
reorganization and rebranding described above. A policy of centralization and 
professionalization, designed to improve prospects in Scotland, wrought 
severe damage on the social and cultural ties of the party at local level and 
replaced a name with strong indigenous political associations (Unionist) with 
one that seemed alien or, at least, English (Conservative).94 
 One does not need to delve very deeply into the minutes of the Scottish 
organization to find examples of discontent with this centralizing trend. At the 
North Eastern Regional Council, for example, a member of the Women’s 
Advisory Committee moved the following resolution in Autumn 1966: ‘That this 
council deplores the lack of information or mention of Scotland or Scottish 
affairs in pamphlets from central office.’95 The cause of the complaint was that 
while her committee had been studying education, CCO had provided a list of 
suggested reading. In one of the booklets mentioned there was absolutely no 
discussion of Scottish education; in another the subject was afforded two 
pages out of twenty-six. The following year the President of the SCUA wrote 
to all chairmen advising that funds would not sustain a structure of five 
regional councils beyond the end of 1968 and inviting responses to a 
proposed structure of three councils. Members were incandescent that the 
upheavals of 1965 should be followed so quickly by further proposals for 
reform and the Glasgow Regional Council broadened its critique:  
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The office bearers were extremely critical of the high level of 
expenditure at Central Office and found it difficult to comprehend recent 
appointments to the staff at Central Office immediately after a 
statement by the Chairman that the financial position of the Party was 
critical. They were also critical of the almost complete domination of the 
organisation in Scotland by Central Office and were of the view that 
greater emphasis should be placed on the Constituency 
organisations.’96 
 
Such efforts were, of course, part of a much wider programme of 
professionalization which, took in the whole of the UK and was pursued 
through abortive schemes such as ‘Project ‘67’ and efforts to re-energize the 
Conservative Political Centre.97 This last must have seemed particularly 
noxious. Barry Henderson was doing the rounds of the Regional Councils n 
the Spring of 1968, pointing to the Conservative Political Centre as a vehicle 
for the transmission of policy ideas from the constituencies to the leadership.98 
At the same time he was intimately involved in the preparations ahead of 
Heath’s Declaration, an announcement which had not been presented for 
discussion in the constituencies at all. What is evident is that if these 
organizational efforts had only marginal success in England, they had a pretty 
catastrophic effect on the party in Scotland, for whom ‘Central Office’ had 
become shorthand for all of the iniquities of restless and disruptive 
restructuring throughout the 1960s.  
 
V 
 
The period between 1968 and 1973 saw the Conservative Party develop and 
endorse a policy of devolution via an elected Assembly in Scotland. We 
should not interpret this development as either the matured endpoint of a 
longstanding Conservative/Unionist engagement with decentralization and 
devolution or as a purely cynical and opportunistic deployment of a ‘Scottish 
card’ played in support of short-term electoral advantage and as a 
prophylactic against nationalism. It has been argued above that it was both of 
these, but that neither explains adequately the origins or outcomes of the 
policy. Crucial was the interaction of these two ways of thinking about 
Scotland’s position with one another and with wider contexts provided by 
party change and political disenchantment. 
 This analysis has wider relevance, both for understanding how the 
Conservative Party navigated the ‘Scottish question’ during the 1970s and 
beyond and for assessing explanations for Conservative decline in Scotland in 
the late twentieth century. The Declaration of Perth and the discussions that 
followed helped to shape Conservative responses to future challenges. A 
policy which had divided opinion within the Scottish party and delivered few if 
any electoral benefits in 1970 provided a troublesome anchor when 
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constitutional issues re-emerged, dramatically, from the middle of the 1970s.99 
Certainly, the multi-party context and the responses of other parties to 
nationalism left even less space for the development of Conservative 
solutions. In particular, following the recommendations of the Kilbrandon 
report and SNP electoral success at both general elections in 1974, the 
Labour Party remarkably quickly and with considerable success managed to 
establish its credentials as the party of devolution.100 
 The Conservatives’ earlier discussion carried certain implications for 
their party. First, it had served to establish battle-lines within the parliamentary 
party, which would harden across the decade. Pro-devolutionists (among 
them Malcolm Rifkind and Alick Buchanan-Smith) and anti-devolutionists 
(such as Iain Sproat and Betty Harvie-Anderson) had aired arguments and 
made commitments that were revived and extended after 1974. Second, while 
the Declaration of Perth and the report of the Constitutional Committee 
provided an easy and endlessly reiterated point – that the Conservative Party 
had begun its serious consideration of devolution well before the Labour Party 
– this brought its own problems.101 Intended as a bold move in 1968, the 
proposals embodied in the 1970 report represented the outer limits of what 
Conservative Party opinion could reasonably endorse. Thereafter the 
Conservatives were stuck with a lukewarm commitment to a scheme, which, 
by the mid-1970s, did not seem likely to be electorally appealing and 
remained divisive within the party itself. The room for manoeuvre was 
extremely limited and any bids to outflank Labour (such as the consideration 
of full federalism) seemed even less appealing. It was the last time that the 
Conservatives could or did ‘set the agenda on the Scottish Question’.102 
 Faced with a similar set of challenges to those they had met between 
1966 and 1970 – a demoralized and divided party and an unenviable electoral 
landscape in Scotland and divisions among the wider parliamentary party – 
Conservative leaders after 1976 took different decisions and drifted further 
from both the commitment to devolution (as well as to other constitutional 
reforms) and from the party in Scotland itself. Further bouts of centralization in 
the party machinery did little to reverse trends highlighted above.103 
 When the party moved against legislative devolution from 1976 
onwards, the discussions and evidence gathered since 1968 furnished a 
ready repertoire of palatable alternatives, which could be dipped into and 
developed over the following decades. Further administrative devolution, 
including the provision for Scottish Grand Committee sittings to be held in 
Edinburgh as had been suggested by Ian Lang and others, followed in the 
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early 1980s.104 There was some attempt to address what Selby Wright had 
called ‘psychologically and emotionally important’ issues, with Michael 
Forsyth’s tartan-clad repatriation of the Stone of Destiny in 1996 being only 
the most prominent example.105 It was, however, a minor strand from among 
constituency responses – that the answer was to ‘re-establish pride in Britain’ 
– that furnished the rhetorical style of Thatcherism. 
 These considerations raise a final methodological point. In examining 
the electoral decline of Conservatism in Scotland, recent accounts have laid 
emphasis less upon social and economic change or shifts in the values and 
identities of voters and more upon changes in the presentation of the party 
and its policies in Scotland. A new narrative is now taking shape, in which the 
Conservative Party was hobbled by its own strategies at least as much as it 
was the hapless victim of forces beyond its control.106 In terms of 
organization, measures of centralization alienated the party in Scotland from 
the 1960s onwards. In terms of rhetoric and presentation, an historic 
Unionism, with its strong appeal to Scottish nationality, lost out to the 
endorsement of a narrower unitary British patriotism, which held little 
attraction for many Scots. What we lack are adequate accounts of how the 
Conservative Party came to arrive at these positions on Scotland and thus of 
how the powerful legacy of Unionism came to be sidelined. Arguably these 
can best be provided by historians reconstructing the complex contexts and 
series of interactions between a number of groups – Conservative leaders in 
both Scotland and England, the research departments, polling organisations 
and policy groups, Conservative activists, constituency associations and 
voters more generally – at key moments. Such accounts would allow us to 
both broaden and deepen our explanations for the political demise of an 
historically successful Unionism. It may ultimately be true that ‘the assassin 
was Thatcher’, but she did not work alone.107 
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